Thank You Mr. Friedman

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(July 31, 1912 - November 16, 2006)

Milton Friedman, famed Nobel Prize-winning economist who fathered Monetary Policy, which served as the economic roadmap for US President Ronald Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, passed away today at the age of 94.

Friedman ushered in a new thinking in economics by posing a powerful argument against socialist economic policy predicated upon the views articulated by John Maynard Keynes during the early 20th century. Additionally, Friedman like many of the great economists, was a brilliant social theorist as evinced by his most famous works, Capitalism and Freedom and Free To Choose: A Personal Statement which he co-wrote with his wife Rose Friedman. Friedman was a stalwart defender of individual liberty and its concomitant result, free enterprise.

I bid a warm “Farewell” and an eternal “Thank You” to Milton Friedman.

The Proper Limits of Judicial Authority

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This is a draft of the dissenting opinion in the matter of PLYLER v. DOE, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). Although the majority ruled in favor of ordering the State of Texas to grant taxpayer-funded primary and secondary educational benefits to the children of illegal aliens, it is the dissenting opinion that truly gets to the root of the matter of judicial activism and policy-making from the bench. As this court has said, "The Constitution does not provide a cure for every social ill, nor does it vest judges with a mandate to try to remedy every social problem. Moreover, when this Court rushes in to remedy what it perceives to be the failings of the political processes, it deprives those processes of an opportunity to function. When the political institutions are not forced to exercise constitutionally allocated powers and responsibilities, those powers, like muscles not used, tend to atrophy. Today's cases, I regret to say, present yet another example of unwarranted judicial action which in the long run tends to contribute to the weakening of our political processes."

U.S. Supreme Court
PLYLER v. DOE, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)

457 U.S. 202

PLYLER, SUPERINTENDENT, TYLER INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL.v. DOE, GUARDIAN, ET AL.APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUITNo. 80-1538.Argued December 1, 1981Decided June 15, 1982

CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, with whom JUSTICE WHITE, JUSTICE REHNQUIST, and JUSTICE O'CONNOR join, dissenting.

Were it our business to set the Nation's social policy, I would agree without hesitation that it is senseless for an enlightened society to deprive any children - including illegal aliens - of an elementary education. I fully agree that it would be folly - and wrong - to tolerate creation of a segment of society made up of illiterate persons, many having a limited or no command of our language. However, the Constitution does not constitute us as "Platonic Guardians" nor does it vest in this Court the authority to strike down laws because they do not meet our standards of desirable social policy, "wisdom," or "common sense." See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 -195 (1978). We trespass on the assigned function of the political branches under our structure of limited and separated powers when we assume a policymaking role as the Court does today.

The Court makes no attempt to disguise that it is acting to make up for Congress' lack of "effective leadership" in dealing with the serious national problems caused by the influx of uncountable millions of illegal aliens across our borders. See ante, at 237-238 (POWELL, J., concurring). The failure of enforcement of the immigration laws over more than a decade and the inherent difficulty and expense of sealing our vast borders have combined to create a grave socioeconomic dilemma. It is a dilemma that has not yet even been fully assessed, let alone addressed. However, it is not the function of the Judiciary to provide "effective leadership" simply because the political branches of government fail to do so.

The Court's holding today manifests the justly criticized judicial tendency to attempt speedy and wholesale formulation of "remedies" for the failures - or simply the laggard pace - of the political processes of our system of government. The Court employs, and in my view abuses, the Fourteenth Amendment in an effort to become an omnipotent and omniscient problem solver. That the motives for doing so are noble and compassionate does not alter the fact that the Court distorts our constitutional function to make amends for the defaults of others.

I

In a sense, the Court's opinion rests on such a unique confluence of theories and rationales that it will likely stand for little beyond the results in these particular cases. Yet the extent to which the Court departs from principled constitutional adjudication is nonetheless disturbing.
I have no quarrel with the conclusion that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to aliens who, after their illegal entry into this country, are indeed physically "within the jurisdiction" of a state. However, as the Court concedes, this "only begins the inquiry." Ante, at 215. The Equal Protection Clause does not mandate identical treatment of different categories of persons. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 549 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971); Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 -148 (1940).
The dispositive issue in these cases, simply put, is whether, for purposes of allocating its finite resources, a state has a legitimate reason to differentiate between persons [457 U.S. 202, 244] who are lawfully within the state and those who are unlawfully there. The distinction the State of Texas has drawn - based not only upon its own legitimate interests but on classifications established by the Federal Government in its immigration laws and policies - is not unconstitutional.

A

The Court acknowledges that, except in those cases when state classifications disadvantage a "suspect class" or impinge upon a "fundamental right," the Equal Protection Clause permits a state "substantial latitude" in distinguishing between different groups of persons. Ante, at 216-217. Moreover, the Court expressly - and correctly - rejects any suggestion that illegal aliens are a suspect class, ante, at 219, n. 19, or that education is a fundamental right, ante, at 221, 223. Yet by patching together bits and pieces of what might be termed quasi-suspect-class and quasi-fundamental-rights analysis, the Court spins out a theory custom-tailored to the facts of these cases.
In the end, we are told little more than that the level of scrutiny employed to strike down the Texas law applies only when illegal alien children are deprived of a public education, see ante, at 223-224. If ever a court was guilty of an unabashedly result-oriented approach, this case is a prime example.

(1)

The Court first suggests that these illegal alien children, although not a suspect class, are entitled to special solicitude under the Equal Protection Clause because they lack "control" over or "responsibility" for their unlawful entry into this country. Ante, at 220, 223-224. Similarly, the Court appears to take the position that 21.031 is presumptively "irrational" because it has the effect of imposing "penalties" [457 U.S. 202, 245] on "innocent" children. Ibid. See also ante, at 238-239 (POWELL, J., concurring). However, the Equal Protection Clause does not preclude legislators from classifying among persons on the basis of factors and characteristics over which individuals may be said to lack "control." Indeed, in some circumstances persons generally, and children in particular, may have little control over or responsibility for such things as their ill health, need for public assistance, or place of residence. Yet a state legislature is not barred from considering, for example, relevant differences between the mentally healthy and the mentally ill, or between the residents of different counties, simply because these may be factors unrelated to individual choice or to any "wrongdoing." The Equal Protection Clause protects against arbitrary and irrational classifications, and against invidious discrimination stemming from prejudice and hostility; it is not an all-encompassing "equalizer" designed to eradicate every distinction for which persons are not "responsible." [457 U.S. 202, 246]
The Court does not presume to suggest that appellees' purported lack of culpability for their illegal status prevents them from being deported or otherwise "penalized" under federal law. Yet would deportation be any less a "penalty" than denial of privileges provided to legal residents? Illegality of presence in the United States does not - and need not - depend on some amorphous concept of "guilt" or "innocence" concerning an alien's entry. Similarly, a state's use of federal immigration status as a basis for legislative classification is not necessarily rendered suspect for its failure to take such factors into account.
The Court's analogy to cases involving discrimination against illegitimate children - see ante, at 220; ante, at 238-239 (POWELL, J., concurring) - is grossly misleading. The State has not thrust any disabilities upon appellees due to their "status of birth." Cf. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 176 (1972). Rather, appellees' status is predicated upon the circumstances of their concededly illegal presence in this country, and is a direct result of Congress' obviously valid exercise of its "broad constitutional powers" in the field of immigration and naturalization. U.S. Const., Art. I, 8, cl. 4; see Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948). This Court has recognized that in allocating governmental benefits to a given class of aliens, one "may take into account the character of the relationship between the alien and this country." Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976). When that "relationship" is a federally prohibited one, there can, of course, be no presumption that a state has a constitutional duty to include illegal aliens among the recipients of its governmental benefits.

(2)

The second strand of the Court's analysis rests on the premise that, although public education is not a constitutionally guaranteed right, "neither is it merely some governmental `benefit' indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation." Ante, at 221. Whatever meaning or relevance this opaque observation might have in some other context, 8 it simply has no bearing on the issues at hand. Indeed, it is never made clear what the Court's opinion means on this score.
The importance of education is beyond dispute. Yet we have held repeatedly that the importance of a governmental service does not elevate it to the status of a "fundamental right" for purposes of equal protection analysis. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30 -31 (1973); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73 -74 (1972). In San Antonio Independent School Dist., supra, JUSTICE POWELL, speaking for the Court, expressly rejected the proposition that state laws dealing with public education are subject to special scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. Moreover, the Court points to no meaningful way to distinguish between education and other governmental benefits [457 U.S. 202, 248] in this context. Is the Court suggesting that education is more "fundamental" than food, shelter, or medical care?
The Equal Protection Clause guarantees similar treatment of similarly situated persons, but it does not mandate a constitutional hierarchy of governmental services. JUSTICE POWELL, speaking for the Court in San Antonio Independent School Dist. supra, at 31, put it well in stating that to the extent this Court raises or lowers the degree of "judicial scrutiny" in equal protection cases according to a transient Court majority's view of the societal importance of the interest affected, we "assum[e] a legislative role and one for which the Court lacks both authority and competence." Yet that is precisely what the Court does today. See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 655 -661 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
The central question in these cases, as in every equal protection case not involving truly fundamental rights "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution," San Antonio Independent School Dist., supra, at 33-34, is whether there is some legitimate basis for a legislative distinction between different classes of persons. The fact that the distinction is drawn in legislation affecting access to public education - as opposed to legislation allocating other important governmental benefits, such as public assistance, health care, or housing - cannot make a difference in the level of scrutiny applied.

B

Once it is conceded - as the Court does - that illegal aliens are not a suspect class, and that education is not a fundamental right, our inquiry should focus on and be limited to whether the legislative classification at issue bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 -487 (1970); see ante, at 216.
The State contends primarily that 21.031 serves to prevent undue depletion of its limited revenues available for education, and to preserve the fiscal integrity of the State's school-financing system against an ever-increasing flood of illegal aliens - aliens over whose entry or continued presence it has no control. Of course such fiscal concerns alone could not justify discrimination against a suspect class or an arbitrary and irrational denial of benefits to a particular group of persons. Yet I assume no Member of this Court would argue that prudent conservation of finite state revenues is per se an illegitimate goal. Indeed, the numerous classifications this Court has sustained in social welfare legislation were invariably related to the limited amount of revenues available to spend on any given program or set of programs. See, e. g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S., at 549 -551; Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 487. The significant question here is whether the requirement of tuition from illegal aliens who attend the public schools - as well as from residents of other states, for example - is a rational and reasonable means of furthering the State's legitimate fiscal ends.
Without laboring what will undoubtedly seem obvious to many, it simply is not "irrational" for a state to conclude that it does not have the same responsibility to provide benefits for persons whose very presence in the state and this country is illegal as it does to provide for persons lawfully present. By definition, illegal aliens have no right whatever to be here, and the state may reasonably, and constitutionally, elect not to provide them with governmental services at the expense of those who are lawfully in the state. 11 In De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357 (1976), we held that a State may protect its "fiscal interests and lawfully resident labor force from the deleterious effects on its economy resulting from the employment of illegal aliens." And only recently this Court made clear that a State has a legitimate interest in protecting and preserving the quality of its schools and "the right of its own bona fide residents to attend such institutions on a preferential tuition basis." Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 453 (1973) (emphasis added). See also Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647, 663 -668 (1978). The Court has failed to offer even a plausible explanation why illegality of residence [457 U.S. 202, 251] in this country is not a factor that may legitimately bear upon the bona fides of state residence and entitlement to the benefits of lawful residence.
It is significant that the Federal Government has seen fit to exclude illegal aliens from numerous social welfare programs, such as the food stamp program, 7 U.S.C. 2015 (f) (1976 ed. and Supp. IV) and 7 CFR 273.4 (1981), the old-age assistance, aid to families with dependent children, aid to the blind, aid to the permanently and totally disabled, and supplemental security income programs, 45 CFR 233.50 (1981), the Medicare hospital insurance benefits program, 42 U.S.C. 1395i-2 and 42 CFR 405.205(b) (1981), and the Medicaid hospital insurance benefits for the aged and disabled program, 42 U.S.C. 1395o and 42 CFR 405.103 (a) (4) (1981). Although these exclusions do not conclusively demonstrate the constitutionality of the State's use of the same classification for comparable purposes, at the very least they tend to support the rationality of excluding illegal alien residents of a state from such programs so as to preserve the state's finite revenues for the benefit of lawful residents. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 80; see also n. 7, supra.
The Court maintains - as if this were the issue - that "barring undocumented children from local schools would not necessarily improve the quality of education provided in those [457 U.S. 202, 252] schools." Ante, at 229. See 458 F. Supp. 569, 577 (ED Tex. 1978). 13 However, the legitimacy of barring illegal aliens from programs such as Medicare or Medicaid does not depend on a showing that the barrier would "improve the quality" of medical care given to persons lawfully entitled to participate in such programs. Modern education, like medical care, is enormously expensive, and there can be no doubt that very large added costs will fall on the State or its local school districts as a result of the inclusion of illegal aliens in the tuition-free public schools. The State may, in its discretion, use any savings resulting from its tuition requirement to "improve the quality of education" in the public school system, or to enhance the funds available for other social programs, or to reduce the tax burden placed on its residents; each of these ends is "legitimate." The State need not show, as the Court implies, that the incremental cost of educating illegal aliens will send it into bankruptcy, or have a "`grave impact on the quality of education,'" ante, at 229; that is not dispositive under a "rational basis" scrutiny. In the absence of a constitutional imperative to provide for the education of illegal aliens, the State may "rationally" choose to take advantage of whatever savings will accrue from limiting access to the tuition-free public schools to its own lawful residents, excluding even citizens of neighboring States.
Denying a free education to illegal alien children is not a choice I would make were I a legislator. Apart from compassionate considerations, the long-range costs of excluding any children from the public schools may well outweigh the costs of educating them. But that is not the issue; the fact [457 U.S. 202, 253] that there are sound policy arguments against the Texas Legislature's choice does not render that choice an unconstitutional one.

II

The Constitution does not provide a cure for every social ill, nor does it vest judges with a mandate to try to remedy every social problem. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S., at 74 . See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 624 -625 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Moreover, when this Court rushes in to remedy what it perceives to be the failings of the political processes, it deprives those processes of an opportunity to function. When the political institutions are not forced to exercise constitutionally allocated powers and responsibilities, those powers, like muscles not used, tend to atrophy. Today's cases, I regret to say, present yet another example of unwarranted judicial action which in the long run tends to contribute to the weakening of our political processes.
Congress, "vested by the Constitution with the responsibility of protecting our borders and legislating with respect to aliens," ante, at 237 (POWELL, J., concurring), bears primary responsibility for addressing the problems occasioned by the millions of illegal aliens flooding across our southern border. Similarly, it is for Congress, and not this Court, to [457 U.S. 202, 254] assess the "social costs borne by our Nation when select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our social order rests." Ante, at 221; see ante, at 223-224. While the "specter of a permanent caste" of illegal Mexican residents of the United States is indeed a disturbing one, see ante, at 218-219, it is but one segment of a larger problem, which is for the political branches to solve. I find it difficult to believe that Congress would long tolerate such a self-destructive result - that it would fail to deport these illegal alien families or to provide for the education of their children. Yet instead of allowing the political processes to run their course - albeit with some delay - the Court seeks to do Congress' job for it, compensating for congressional inaction. It is not unreasonable to think that this encourages the political branches to pass their problems to the Judiciary.
The solution to this seemingly intractable problem is to defer to the political processes, unpalatable as that may be to some.

All, Foley. All the time

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Perhaps I am out of fashion with the times but I don’t get this obsession with the “Foley” story. While I admit that I have an almost innate propensity to go in the opposite direction of conventional wisdom and modern social and political currents, I suspect that I am not alone in this view.

What Foley did may have been within the confines of codified laws in both Florida and Wahsington, DC where the “age of consent” is 16 years, but his behaviour violated every tenet of moral and ethical decency and sound judgment. It is a sad fact of our age that what men find acceptable in the law is usually those vices which they themselves wish to partake and since most people wish to do that which conforms to acceptable social norms, one seeks to have the desired vice written into law. That being the said, Foley has resigned and this should have been one-day story.

In comes the media and the Democrat political machine (though it is difficult to distinguish the two).

Democrats have had this information for some time and chose to make it a “news” story on the eve on an election. Much like the Dan Rather story about George Bush’s National Guard service. This accounts for the daily drip, drip of information which serves only to keep the story alive. For Dems this is a welcome distraction from the issues of the day since they were losing ground in that regard. The media is all too wiling to go along with it since it serves their own political agendas and lust for the prurient. What amazes me is that Republicans are once again showing themselves to be easy marks.

Conservatives on talk radio are helping to fuel this story by turning their shows in to “All Foley, All the Time.” I have ceased listening to talk-radio which I love. I cannot abide this daily Foley-Fest.

Enough of it already. Let’s get back to the real issues of this election year.

Americans In Wonderland

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A friend recently sent to me a Reuters story on the Bush Administration’s proposed budget for the 2007 fiscal period. The author of the story provided a very “objective” analysis of the President’s proposals in the typical advocacy-journalism manner. In pertinent part, the President is proposing a .05% reduction in discretionary spending with exception of national security items.

If you are a Leftist you’re probably thinking all sorts of nasty things about the President at this point and if you are on the political right, you’re dancing a jig. But before you get too angry or happy you might want to read a little further.

If you have ever read Alice in Wonderland, you are familiar with the following exchange between Alice and Humpty Dumpty concerning the obvious meaning of words:

“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “itmeans just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.”
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.”
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master—that’s all.”

--- Louis Carrol, Alice in Wonderland.

So remember that we are talking about the government and just as in Wonderland, words don’t always mean what you think they mean.

Where government fiscal policy is concerned, a “cut” isn’t actually a reduction in overall dollars expended on a particular programme. Rather “cut” simply means that there is a reduction in the rate of growth over the previous year’s budgetary allotment (a.k.a. the “Baseline”). That is to say, if the programme is guaranteed an annual increase of 10% over Baseline and the future budget allows for an increase of 8% instead, this is considered – in Washingtonese – a spending/budget cut of 2%. You’re probably thinking: “But that’s an increase of 8%!!” That just goes to show that you are in no way qualified for a career in politics. By the way, all non-discretionary budget items have guaranteed increases.

The reason this system works (most of the time that is) is that the government has the ability to tax. When their shenanigans get out of hand, they simply levy a higher tax to cover the errors. And don’t forget, they can also “borrow” funds from the “Social Security Trust Fund,” which is kept in a secure location where it is protected under the watchful eyes of Santa Claus and the Easter Bunny.

The point is, you can never truly “cut” government spending. As Ronald Reagan said, “The closest we will ever come to eternal life is a government programme.”

Declaration of War - For Beginners

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I have been labouring on this for some time now but matters of late have forced me to put it to pen.

There seems to be a great deal of confusion – much of it deliberately so – regarding Presidential and Congressional war powers and more importantly, what constitutes a “declaration of war.”

First things first, let’s turn to the specific language of the U.S. Constitution on these matters:

Article I, Section 8 – The Congress has the sole power “to declare war.”

Article II, Section 2 – “The President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States;”

Turning to the matter of Congressional powers, the Constitution grants Congress sole power to declare war. This is the only reference to a declaration of war in the document. There is no formal template or language that must be used in the process. A declaration of war is merely Congressional authorization or mandate to the commander in chief that war be made against a known entity. The logic of placing such power within the hands of the legislature is that the legislature is directly accountable to the people in their districts or States and therefore represents “the people” in a more direct sense than does the executive. Additionally, we have to be mindful of the kinds of governments under which the framers of the Constitution (hereinafter, “the framers”) lived in earlier times.

In Europe and Great Britain, the power to declare war or shall we say, commit the nation to war rested solely with the individual leader of the nation be it a King, a Prince, a Potentate or in some cases a small cabal of aristocrats. The governed had no power to determine the merits of such a decision, nor could they opt out of service once committed. In essence, the King of England could awake one morning and decide that the nation should go to war against Norway.

The framers sought, by placing such authority in the hands of Congress, to avoid such an occurrence. Any and all offensive military engagements must be authorized by the U.S. Congress. Under the strictest interpretation of Article I, Section 8, it is arguable that the Congress can mandate action against a foreign power even if the President disagrees. I note with interest HR 4655 (aka, Iraq Liberation Act of 1988) which, “Declares that it should be the policy of the United States to seek to remove the Saddam Hussein regime from power in Iraq and to replace it with a democratic government.” This Bill was passed by a near unanimous vote and signed into law by the President. While there is no evidence that the President opposed the Bill, a near unanimous vote essentially made it veto-proof. Not in law of course but certainly in fact. Whereas the President had the authority to veto the Bill, there were more than enough votes in Congress to make it law notwithstanding.

On the other hand, under the Constitution, the President cannot under any circumstances take offensive military action without the expressed, written consent of the Congress. The President is however duty-bound to take defensive action whenever the interests of the United States come under attack or are in imminent threat thereof. Simply stated, the President must always meet force with force.

This authority was, for the first time in U.S. history, challenged before the Supreme Court during the Civil War. Namely, the Prize Cases (67 U.S. 635 [1863]), which states in summary that:

“A state of actual war may exist without any formal declaration of it by either party, and this is true of both a civil and a foreign war.”

To sum up the Prize Cases it must first be noted that this was a consolidation of several cases which came before the Supreme Court as a result of a Presidential blockade and subsequent seizure of cargo from ships entering blockaded Confederate ports. As the seized cargo was known as a “prize’ the cases were consolidated under the title, Prize Cases.

The appellants argued that the blockade was unconstitutional because, inter alia, Congress had never formally declared war. The President, as they alleged, did not have the authority to issue a naval blockade absent Congressional mandate(declaration). It is the opinion of Justice Grier that is most noteworthy herein:

“Let us enquire whether, at the time this blockade was instituted, a state of war existed which would justify a resort to these means of subduing the hostile force.

War has been well defined to be, "That state in which a nation prosecutes its right by force."

The parties belligerent in a public war are independent nations. But it is not necessary, to constitute war, that both parties should be acknowledged as independent nations or sovereign States. A war may exist where one of the belligerents claims sovereign rights as against the other.

By the Constitution, Congress alone has the power to declare a national or foreign war. It cannot declare war against a State, or any number of States, by virtue of any clause in the Constitution. The Constitution confers on the President the whole Executive power. He is bound to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. He is Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States when called into the actual service of the United States. He has no power to initiate or declare a war either against a foreign nation or a domestic State. But, by the Acts of Congress of February 28th, 1795, and 3d of March, 1807, he is authorized to called out the militia and use the military and naval forces of the United States in case of invasion by foreign nations and to suppress insurrection against the government of a State or of the United States.

If a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force. He does not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special legislative authority. And whether the hostile party be a foreign invader or States organized in rebellion, it is nonetheless a war although the declaration of it be "unilateral." Lord Stowell (1 Dodson 247) observes,

It is not the less a war on that account, for war may exist without a declaration on either side. It is so laid down by the best writers on the law of nations. A declaration of war by one country only is not a mere challenge to be accepted or refused at pleasure by the other.”

The Prize Cases have never been overturned by the Supreme Court, nor nullified by act of Congress. I would be hard pressed to understand the logic of such action considering the fact that the decision was nothing more than a restatement of common sense and logic.

For these and other reasons, I have long argued that The War Powers Act of 1973 (aka, “War Powers Resolution”) is unconstitutional. This Act, irrespective of the intentions of the Congress in drafting it, resulted in a de facto amendment to the Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution by granting the President the power to take offensive military action for a period of sixty(60) days without Congressional authorization or consent. Section 5(b) of Public Law 93-148, H.J. Resolution 542, reads:

“Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1), whichever is earlier, the President shall terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which such report was submitted (or required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States. Such sixty-day period shall be extended for not more than an additional thirty days if the President determines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such forces.”

This law has been used by Presidents over the years to the effect of committing U.S. forces to numerous military engagement around the globe, including but not limited to, Lebanon, Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo (in no particular order). The War Powers Act did not come as a result of a Constitutional amendment, rather it was the result of Constitutional ignorance on the part of the American public. This same ignorance is the sole reason why there is so much confusion over the very meaning of a “declaration of war.”

I encourage everyone to read the Constitution. I further encourage you to read the very documents upon which the Constitution was predicated, The Federalist Papers. Additionally, you may want to look into key Supreme Court decisions over the years which purportedly “interpret” the Constitution. This would be a pretty good starting point for improving your understanding of these and other issues. Don’t be discouraged or dissuaded from this task by those who proclaim the Constitution beyond the understanding of the average person. Those types seek to keep you in a perpetual state of ignorance and your ignorance serves only to solidify their power over you.

There was a time when the “church” forbade the reading of the Bible. The reasoning was much the same: it was beyond your ability to understand. In fact, reading the Bible could result in a charge of heresy. The “church” controlled the people by limiting their ability to gain their own understanding. Once these seemingly impregnable walls were breached, the collapse of the tyranny of the elites came to a crashing end. Don’t allow the new elites to place you back into bondage to ignorance.